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AMERICA'S SHIFTING FASCINATION WITH 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
EDWARD B. ROCK' 
In the last few years, comparative corporate governance-German and 
Japanese corporate governance in particular-has been a hot topic in U.S. 
law reviews and conferences. 1 Some of the best contemporary corporate 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This is a revised version of a 
lecture I gave to German bankers, corporate lawyers and academics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe -
Universitiit, Frankfurt am Main, Germany in June 1994. 
I am grateful to participants in workshops at the Faculty of Law, Johann Wolfgang Goelhe -
Universitiit, Frankfurt am Main, and the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for helpful 
comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Mark Roe and Richard Buxbaum for helping me 
(incompletely, I fear) to avoid mischaracterizing their views. All remaining errors are, of course, my 
own. The interested reader should read the marvelous articles by Professors Roe and Buxbaum and 
others and form their own judgments. This work was supported by the Univers ity of Pennsylvania's 
Institute for Law and Economics and the Institut ftir Arbeils-, Wirtschafts- und Zivil Recht, Faculty of 
Law, Johann Wolfgang Goelhe - Universitiit, Frankfurt am Mair1. 
I. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Brittanfa ?: Institutional Investor 
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997 ( 1994); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional 
Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. I ( 1991 ); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as C01porate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1277 (1991) (discuss ing Germany, Japan, Sweden, Canada and the UK); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Investm ent Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the 
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993) (examining whelher a Swedish form of 
investment company could be useful in American corporate governance); Ronald J. Gilson & Rein ier 
Kraakrnan, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863, 876 ( 1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director]; Ronald J. Gilson 
& Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Co1porate Governance and 
Industrial Organization, I 02 YALE L.J. 871 ( 1993); Martin Liplon & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New 
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 
218-22 (1991) (drawing parallels to the German and Japanese systems); J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers 
in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REv. I (1987); Mark J. Roe, 
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1 COLUM. L. REV. I 0, 59-62 ( 1991) (Germany) 
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Stmcture in 
Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (hereinafter Roc, Some Differences]; 
Symposium: The American Corporation and The Institutional lnvestor: Are There Lessons from 
Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 739. 
These art icles should be distinguished from the interesting and informative comparative work 
produced by foreign comparativists, which raise different issues. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, In Search 
of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's 
Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663 ( 1984); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: 
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338 ( 1984); 
Friedrich K. Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. 
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law scholars have focused on German bank centered corporate governance 
structures, as well as the Japanese bank centered keiretsu structure/ for 
alternatives to traditional U.S. forms. What is one to make of this 
development? The intuition that one can fruitfully transplant legal rules or 
institutions from one system to another is as old as the law itself_3 The 
temptation is to try to get something for nothing, or at least at a discount. 
In this Article, I want to focus on the specific emergence of the 
comparativist tum in American corporate law scholarship, to try to appraise 
the significance of the recent American fascination with German and 
Japanese corporate governance, and to consider what it tells us about the 
possible path dependance of corporate law scholarship. Before turning to 
the comparative scholarship, however, I will first try to put it into context 
by giving a quick and somewhat idiosyncratic overview of the modem 
history of corporate law scholarship in the United States. 
I. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE: BERLE AND MEANS 
Writing in the depths of the Great Depression, Adolf Berte and Gardiner 
Means set the course of modem American corporate law scholarship. 4 
When one reads their great work, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, 5 the contemporary scholar finds its style and much of its content 
as familiar, as comfortable, as any recently published article. While many 
of its analyses and prescriptions are dated, it continues to define the field. 
In their book, Berle, a law professor, and Means, an economist, set out 
to map the separation of ownership and control that they took to define the 
modem publicly held corporation. In Book 1,6 Berle and Means document-
ed in detail the concentration of economic power in the largest corpora-
tions, the vas t dispersion of ownership7 and the mechanisms that managers 
used to maintain control over a corporation that they did not own. In Book 
L. REV. 97 ( 1991 ); Christian J. Meicr-Schatz, Corporate Governance and Legal Rules: A Transnational 
Look at Concepts and Problems of In ternal Managemem Control, 13 J. COIU'. L. 431 ( 1988). 
2. The term Keiretsu describes the Japanese system of cross-shareholding between related 
corporations. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note I. 
3. For a marvelous historical account, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS ( 1974). 
4. ADOLPH A. SERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI VATE 
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991 ). 
5. !d. My sense is that this is a book more cited rather than read. If true, it is unfortunate both 
because of the book's influence on modern scholarship as well as its st ill substantial merits as corporate 
law scholarship that bridges economics and legal doctrine. 
6. !d. at 3-112. 
7. In 1929, the largest shareholders of the largest corporations typically owned less than! %; even 
the top 20 shareholders, in aggregate, owned no more than 4%. 
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II,8 they described the declining legal restnctwns on management, 
including the weakening of shareholder control over the direction of the 
enterprise,9 the elimination of state supervision over contributions of 
capital, 10 the diminution of preemptive rights, 11 and the modifications of 
restrictions on dividends. 12 These two sections, which comprise the bulk 
of the book, led Berle and Means to claim that "under such conditions 
control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ 
the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as 
a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding." 13 
Berle and Means left an indelible stamp on American corporate law 
scholarship in two principal dimensions. First, and probably most 
significantly, they implicitly and explicitly defined the central problem for 
corporate law to be the separation of ownership and control, and defined 
the task of corporate law scholarship to be the correction or, at least, 
mitigation of the negative effects of the separation. Berle and Means argued 
that the law must protect the shareholders who, because of the separation 
of ownership and control, will inevitably be passive . Thus, Berle and 
Means gave American corporate law scholarship a practical, reformist style 
that persists to this day. As we will see, much of the ensuing sixty years 
of scholarship has been a search for the appropriate champion of 
shareholders' interests. 
Second, Berle and Means' analysis began with economics and turned to 
legal and doctrinal issues only after a long empirical analysis. In so doing 
they implicitly claimed that economics drives corporate law, with respect 
to the issues that corporate law must address (the reformist point), as well 
as with respect to the evolution of legal doctrine. The theme of Book II is 
that the concentration of economic power and the separation of ownership 
from control led, through some unspecified mechanism, to the relaxation 
of legal controls over managers. 14 Here, too, Berle and Means' influence 
on corporate law scholarship has been so fundamental and deep-seated that 
American corporate law academics can hardly conceive of alternative 
approaches. Like Berle and Means, almost all corporate law scholars 
8. BERLE & MEANS, sup ra note 4, at 119-244. 
9. !d. at 128-31. 
10. !d. at 131-33. 
II. !d. at 133-35 . 
12. /d. at 135-36. 
13. Jd. at 6 . 
14. !d. at 119-244. 
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respond to the market and focus on the interaction between law and 
economics. 
II. THE 1960s AND 1970s: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS 
SHAREHOLDERS' CHAMPION 
The normative model of the corporation reflected in most corporate 
statutes, as well as in Berle and Means ' work, is that "the business and 
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors." 15 On this model, the shareholders own the corporation 
and delegate the operation of the corporation to the directors, who then set 
policy and hire managers to execute that policy. 
Berle and Means vigorously argued that the reality of the management-
dominated corporation was inconsistent with this normative model. In the 
management-dominated corporation, managers run the show, choosing 
directors and operating free of any shareholder scrutiny. 1 
This gap between the normative model and reality animated much of the 
corporate law scholarship of the period. Some proposed reforms that would 
bring corporate reality into line with the normative model. 16 Three 
institutional failings were thought to stand in the way of directors playing 
the role anticipated by the statute: constraints of time; constraints of 
information; and constraints of composition.17 To redress directors' time 
constraints, a number of scholars proposed the creation of "professional 
directors," directors who, by virtue of being full-time, would have the time 
to behave as the normative model suggested.18 Similarly, other scholars 
proposed that directors have their own separate staff, in order to give them 
the infom1ation and independent expertise necessary to direct the enter-
prise.19 
These proposals-none of which was adopted-faced all of the 
predictable criticisms. Once a director becomes a full-time director, 
especially if appointed by the CEO, how does he or she differ from any of 
the other members of the management group? Would creating a "shadow 
staff," with responsibility for second guessing management but limited 
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). 
16. For a collection of articles that illustrate the populist concerns of scholars of the 1950s, see 
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCI ETY (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
17. For a discussion of these constraints, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 141 -48 (1976). 
18. See id. at 150-52. 
19. See id. at 154-56. 
1996] COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 371 
responsibility for the results, cause more harm than good? Would it be 
duplicative and interfere with the running of the company? 
During this same period, the Securities Exchange Commission began to 
study mutual funds, and their distinctive problems. In a series of reports/0 
close attention was paid to governance problems of investment companies, 
culminating in the 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act. 21 
These amendments introduced a number of governance devices to mitigate 
the conflict of interest between the fund managers and the shareholders of 
the funds. Specifically, the Investment Company Act was amended to 
require that at least forty percent of the directors (or trustees) of an 
investment company be disinterested.Z2 In addition, the Act requires that 
the advisory contracts between Fund X and Adviser Y be in writing, be 
approved by a vote of a majority of outstanding shares, and be approved 
by a majority of the disinterested directors of Fund X. 23 Both amendments 
were designed to strengthen the board of directors as a counterweight to, 
and monitor of, fund managers. 
At around the same time, Melvin Eisenberg, in a series of articles written 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shifted the debate in an important 
direction.24 He argued that the board of the modem, publicly held 
corporation cannot direct the operation of the enterprise, and none of the 
reform proposals of the 1960s was likely to permit it to do so. In the 
modem public corporation, the managers set policy, and no tinkering with 
20. See. e.g., SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1 966); SECURITIES EXCH. 
COMM ' N, INSTITUTIONA L INV ESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. {1971); 
WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUA L FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87 th 
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1962). 
21. In vestment Company Amendments Act of 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-547,84 Sta t. 1413 (codified 
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a). Mutual funds have a distinctive organizationa l form that 
differs from most other corporations. Mutual funds, or, in the terms used in the relevant statutes, 
"investment companies," are companies that invest in securities. Investment Company Act § 3(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1994). Typically, Fund X will be a corporation organized by Investment Adviser 
Firm Y which will manage Fund X for a fee that is usually a percentage of assets under management. 
Having organized Fund X, Adviser Y enters into a management contract with X, which then se lls shares 
of X to the public-sometimes directly, sometimes through brokers. Mutual fund investors arc thus 
shareholders of Fund X, who depend on the performance of Adviser Y for their returns. 
22. Investment Company Act§ IO{a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-IO(a). If an investment company has a 
regular broker or a principal underwriter on its board, a majority of the directors must be independent 
of the broker or underwriter. Investment Company Act§ !O(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-IO(b). 
23. Investment Company Act§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15. 
24. These articles were integrated to form Eisenberg's, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal 
Analysis. EISENBERG, supra note 17. 
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the directors can change this. 
So, argued Eisenberg, one needs to change the normative model to give 
the board a job that it can do. The job that Eisenberg carved out for the 
board is the now familiar notion that the board should monitor manage-
ment. 25 He then set out to describe the changes in the structure of 
corporate governance necessary to permit the board to monitor manage-
ment, generalizing from the mutual fund analysis.26 
For directors to monitor managers on behalf of the (passive) sharehold-
ers, directors must have sufficient time, information and independence to 
do so. Otherwise, the new model would be undermined as the old 
normative model had been. Eisenberg thus argued for the establishment of 
committees of the board comprised of directors independent of manage-
ment. Specifically, he proposed that an audit committee should be 
established, staffed by independent directors charged with the responsibility 
of hiring and firing the outside auditor, determining the appropriate 
accounting principles to be used in presenting the corporation's financial 
reports, and receiving reports from the auditors of any managerial 
malfeasance?7 In order to prevent the CEO from packing the board with 
cronies, or undermining the independence of the board in more subtle ways, 
Eisenberg proposed that the committee responsible for nominating new 
directors and current directors for re-election should be comprised of 
independent directors. Similarly, because compensation of senior manage-
ment is both critical to providing optimal incentives, and is the area in 
which conflicts of interest loom largest, the compensation committee should 
be comprised of independent directors. Finally, because the monitoring of 
senior management performance and the hiring and firing of senior 
management are the single most critical functions of the board, the board 
itself should either be exclusively comprised of independent directors or at 
least dominated by them. 
During this reconceptualization of the board, a number of American 
corporate law academics, most prominently Alfred Conard and Detlev 
Vagts, focused American attention on the German two-tier board structure 
as an institutional alternative and as a suggestive model for reform in the 
United States. 28 Two of the proposals to address separation of ownership 
25. EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 162-68. 
26. !d. at 56-63. 
27. !d. at 205-09. 
28. Alfred F. Conard, Company Laws of the European Communities from an American Viewpoint, 
in THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 45, 52 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1973) 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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and control discussed in the mid-1960s were the appointment of a fiduciary 
to represent the shareholders29 and the intervention of various financial 
intermediaries, particularly pension funds and investment trusts, that would 
gradually begin to exercise the powers to which their holdings entitle 
them. 30 Professor Vagts noted that 
[e]ach of the two approaches just suggested has its rough counterpart in 
German law. The German supervisory council represents a deliberate attempt 
to furnish the shareholders with a "watchdog" group to represent their 
interests, and the bankers' depositary vote is an intermediary that has evolved 
so as to concentrate voting power. 31 
Professor Conard was similarly taken with the German approach: 
The advantages of [the German] system may be more impressive to an 
American than to others because it is in the United States that the theory of 
management control was first articulated by Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means, and has been repeated in later studies .. .. Its most obvious advantage 
is that it provides a separate group of independent observers to decide how 
well the managers are doing. Because they meet separately fro m the 
managers whom they supervise, they are likely to be much more independent 
than the traditional "outside directors" of American boards, who usually meet 
only in the presence, and even under the chairmanship, of the inside 
managers. Moreover, this structure frees them from responsibility fo r the 
ordinary management decisions which are the proper business of the full-time 
executives.32 
In addition to the two-tier board structure, Conard also foc used on other 
distinctive legal features of the German approach, including co-determina-
tion, the existence of a separate legal regime for closely held companies, 
and the system of share certificates in bearer form and the ir transfer. 33 
[hereinafter Conrad, Company Laws]; Detlev Vagts, Reforming the '?,Iodern" Corporation: Perspectives 
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Joachim Lieser, 
Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two Tier" Board Model , 62 KY. L.J. 91 
( 1973). See generally EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 177-85. For later work from the same perspective, 
see Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in 
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984). 
29. See Vagts, supra note 28, at 49 & n.l07. 
30. See id. at 49 & n.l 08. 
31. !d. at 49-50. 
32. Conard , Company Laws, supra note 28, at 52. 
33. !d. at 54-55, 59-62. 1t is important to note that both Vagts and Conard were acu tely aware of 
the dangers and difticulties of comparative approaches. !d. at 53 ("Even assuming that they work qui te 
we ll in West Germany, one may we ll ask whether they wil l be equally effective elsewhere."). See, e.g. , 
Vagts, supra note 28, at 25 ("To approach German corporation law with the objec tive of ga ining 
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III. THE 1980s: THE TAKEOVER ERA 
Beginning in the 1980s, with the widespread and dramatic emergence of 
hostile takeovers in the United States, the focus of corporate law scholar-
ship shifted dramatically away from the Eisenberg approach of focusing on 
legal and institutional mechanisms for controlling management discretion. 
In its place, scholars looked to the market, and, in particular, to the so 
called "market for corporate control" to protect shareholders from 
managerial abuse.34 
Corporate control contests, which combined all of the at~ractions of/high 
stakes poker and war, became the dominant focus of corporate law 
scholarship during the 1980s. While academics disagreed on the details, 
they shared a common and fundamental belief that the market for corporate 
control was the single most important constraint on corporate management 
and that the Jaw should strive to maximize its effectiveness. 35 This 
market-based approach continued to dominate academic corporate law 
perspective on the American situation means that one must face head-on the two most difficult issues 
about any foreign legal institution: (a) How does it work over there? (b) How would it work over 
here?"). 
34. The story really begins with an extraord inarily prescient art icle from 1966 by Henry Manne 
called Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. II 0 (1965). In thi s article, 
Manne argued that a significant cos t of an antitrust pol icy that restricts horizontal mergers is that 
managers will be insulated from the market di sc ipline imposed by the threat of takeovers. The keystone 
of Manne's argument was that competitors are the parties most likely to be able to recognize bad 
management, to be able to reverse it, and to have access to suffic ient financing to acquire poorly 
managed firms. !d. a 112-13, 11 8-1 9. If thi s is correct- and it certainl y seems to be- then the merger 
policy pursued by the Department of Justice in the 1960s, which almost en tirely prohibited horizontal 
mergers, increased managerial dominance at the expense of shareholders. 
Beginning in 1980, with the election of Rona ld Reagan and, more importantly fo r these purposes, 
the appointment of William Baxter as head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, U.S. 
policy on horizontal mergers changed nearly 180 degrees. Suddenly, horizontal mergers, even between 
large firms with relative ly large market shares, were permissible. This brought a large number of eager 
and high valuing buyers into the market for corporate control and se t off a decade long merger boom. 
In the prototypical 1980s ' "bust up" takeover, an acquirer would pay a large prem ium over prevailing 
market price fo r a company. Then the acquirer would se ll off pieces to buyers from the same industry, 
buyers who had previously been excluded from the marke t. 
35 . For representative and prominent examples, see the academic debate over whether target 
management should be passive in the face of a hostile tender offer or whether they should have the 
limited power to seek competing bids. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper 
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV . L. REV. 1161 (198 1) and 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, A11ctions and S11nk Costs in Tender Oj]"ers , 35 STAN. L. REV. 
I (1982) with Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers , 95 HARV. L. 
REV. I 028 ( 1982) and Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versw: Pure Passivity in Tender 
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 5 ! ( 1982). · 
1996] COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 375 
throughout the 1980s and represented a fundamentally different approach 
than either the Eisenberg institutional reform program or the managerial ism 
of corporate management and the lawyers who typically represented them. 
IV. THE 1990s: THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
Then the music stopped. In the late 1980s, in the wake of the 1987 
market crash, the downfall of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the determination 
by the U.S. Supreme Court that the anti-takeover statutes passed by many 
states were constitutional,36 and the decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in the Time Warner case,37 which was widely interpreted as 
permitting target managers to "just say no", the age of hostile tender offers 
died. Suddenly, the shareholders' champion of the 1980s-the market for 
corporate control-seemed to wither away. Wall Street firms laid off or 
reassigned takeover lawyers. Takeover artists shifted their attention (at least 
temporarily) to managing the assets they had acquired. Michael Milken 
went to jail. And corporate law academics looked for something else to 
write about. 
Like Rip Van Winkle waking from a fifty-year sleep, corporate law 
academics returned to the Berle and Means paradigm, but the world seemed 
to have changed. In place of the widely dispersed shareholdings chronicled 
by Berle and Means, we found that shareholding had become much more 
concentrated. Now, we had a group of very large and increasingly active 
institutional investors. 38 Moreover, institutional holdings were (and 
continue to be) concentrated in relatively few institutions, at least in 
comparison to the Berle and Means corporation .39 
Moreover, these institutional investors seemed to have finally found their 
voice. Some began high profile campaigns against management-imposed 
36. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Ameri ca , 48 1 U.S. 69 (1987). 
37. Paramou nt Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc ., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. i 990). It turned out that 
the Time-Warner decision did not protec t target managers to th e ex tent anti cipated. See Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network , Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
38. See generally Edwa rd B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (199 !). Between 1950 and 1989, pension fund s went from 
owning less than I% of equ iti es to hold ing in excess of 26%. !d. at 447. Institutional in ves tors as a 
group (pension funds, mutua l funds, insurance companies, bank-managed funds and cha ri table and 
educational endowments) went from hold ing 8% of equities to more than 45%. !d. Of the top 50 U.S. 
corporations ranked by 1989 stock market va lue, 45 had institutional ownership in excess of 33% and 
25 in excess of 50%, and many with even more. !d. 
39. The twenty largest pens ion funds account for about 26% of the total pens ion fund asse ts. !d. 
at 447-48. 
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takeover defenses and scored significant victories.40 Institutional investors 
1 + . 41 also forced out poor y per.orrmng managers. 
Also during the early 1990s, Mark Roe began to revisit the political 
history of American corporate law.42 In an important series of articles, 
Roe argued that the fragmentation of American shareholding and the 
traditional passivity of American shareholders was not the inevitable result 
of economic growth, as argued by Berle and Means, but was largely the 
result of a series of political choices. Roe suggested that American 
populism combined with interest group politics and the structure of 
American federalism may have led to the fragmentation of the ArJerican 
banking system (with many states confining banks to a single branch), as 
compared to the national banking systems that characterize Germany and 
Japan.43 Likewise, these same forces, Roe argued, may have led to 
prohibitions on shareholding by insurance companies for most of the 
twentieth century,44 as well as regulatory limitations on mutual funds .45 
Scholars began to write on two different aspects of the same problem. 
One group of articles focused on the rise of institutional investors. Within 
this group, there was sharp disagreement over the significance of this 
change and the extent to which institutional investors were likely to emerge 
as shareholders' champions. In the optimists' camp, scholars argued that, 
if only we removed the regulatory barriers to institutional investor activism, 
the newly energized shareholders would assume their rightful place as 
shareholders' champions, acting as effective monitors of management.46 
In making this argument, the optimists, of course, were following in the 
footsteps of Berle and Means in taking the task of corporate law to be the 
40. Rock, supra note 38, at 478-90. 
41. id. 
42. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note I; Mark 1. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 
1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1993) [here inafte r Roe, 
Foundations of Corporate Finance]; Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownersh ip and 
Control of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON . 7 (1990); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in th e 
Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (199 1) [hereinafter Roe, Political 
Elements]. These articles prov ided the basis for Roe's book, MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FI NANCE ( 1994). 
43. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note I. 
44. See Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finan ce, supra note 42. 
45. See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 42 . 
46. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 81 1 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
520 (1990); Gilson & Kraakman, Reinveming the Owside Director, supra note I , at 87 1; Joseph 
Grund fest, The Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FI N. ECON. 89 ( 1990). 
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reformist task of adjusting the law to solve the problem of the separation 
of ownership and control. 
On the other side of the debate, scholars argued that institutional 
investors are unlikely to fulfill their promise .47 The critique has followed 
a number of paths. First, there is little evidence that corporate governance 
activism increases shareholder returns. Second, to the extent that the rise 
of institutional investors helps to solve the collective action problem 
identified by Berle and Means, it does so by means of agents who bring 
with them all of the agency problems so familiar from the corporate 
context. The managers of institutional investors, the money managers, face 
conflicts of interest between their duty to maximize the value of their 
portfolio, and pressure from corporate management, exerted in a variety of 
ways. While managers of public employee pension funds-the most 
prominent institutional investor activists-are relatively immune from 
pressure from corporate management, they are particularly susceptible to 
political pressure.48 Moreover, the incentives facing institutional money 
managers depart sharply from those of their beneficiaries: The agents, 
unlike the beneficiaries, benefit from corporate governance activism only 
if it provides a selective benefit, not if it leads to a systemic improvement. 
Systemic improvements, while increasing the value of the managed 
portfolio, also increase the value of the portfolio of competing money 
managers as well. The lack of incentives is aggravated by the fact that 
managers of widely diversified funds compete to be the low-cost provider, 
leaving little to invest in monitoring corporate managers. 
Finally, the market and institutional checks on money managers are, in 
fact, weaker than those on corporate managers. Takeovers are impossible. 
Capital market checks are non-existent because institutional investors are 
suppliers rather than purchasers of capital. The market for money managers 
supplies an uncertain constraint as it is unclear that active monitoring is 
valued in that market. Finally, product market checks, while in some cases 
significant, vary from institutional investor to institutional investor, with 
many beneficiaries locked in. Legal checks are not much better insofar as 
courts have been even less active in enforcing the duty of loyalty and duty 
of care than in the corporate context. 
47. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note I; Edward B. Rock, Conrrol!ing the Dark Side of Relational 
Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994); Rock, supra note 38 , at 505; Roberta Romano, Public 
Pension Fun d Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 CO LUM. L. RE V. 795 ( 1993). 
48 . Rock, supra note 38, at 471-72 ; Romano, supra note 47. 
378 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 74:367 
V. PROFESSOR ROE'S NEW COMPARATIVISM 
The domestic debate over institutional investors led some scholars to 
look abroad, to discover the role played by institutional investors in other 
systems and to analyze the differences in regulatory treatment. Whereas, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, American legal scholars, like Professors Vagts and 
Conard, looked to German corporate law for alternative legal/institutional I 
arrangements-principally, the two-tier board and, to a lesser extent, co-
determination-attention was now directed to a very different sort of 
comparative analysis, namely, the analysis of alternative economic 
governance structures. In particular, U.S. scholars have focused on the 
relatively prominent role that large banks play in Germany and Japan, as 
compared to the United States.49 
In this context, comparative analyses are important for two reasons. First, 
if governance structures are fundamentally different in other highly 
industrialized and highly successful market economies, such as Germany 
and Japan, then perhaps they could have been different in the United States. 
This goes to the question of whether the Berle and Means corporation is an 
economic inevitability, as they suggested, or is, in large measure, the 
product of a series of political choices, as Roe argues. Second, and more 
reformist, if the structures could have been different, perhaps they should 
be different. Perhaps America would be better off freeing its shareholders, 
especially its large banks, so that they can play a role similar to that played 
by large German and Japanese banks. 
On the first claim, the comparative evidence is important and persuasive. 
As Roe has argued, the fact that governance is organized differently, and 
apparently successfully in other large industrialized economies undermines 
any claim of inevitability to the Berle and Means corporation.50 To the 
extent that differences in corporate governance correlate with differences 
in financial regulation, it lends support to Roe's hypothesis that the politics 
of financial intermediation is a key determinant to corporate structure. In 
the same context, Roe argues against the claim that Germany and Japan 
simply lag behind America's financial evolution, and thus against the 
argument that, in time, finance liquifies and disintermediates . While 
acknowledging that the boardroom power of the large German and Japanese 
49. See. e.g. Roe, Some Differences, supra note I. 
50. See id. For perceptive critiques of Roe's article, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbia Cartel 
Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note 
on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021 (1993). 
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banks is under stress from the increased secuntlzation of debt (which 
displaces bank lending) and the internationalization of financial markets, 
banks' stock ownership and control through the proxy system has remained 
constant or increased? 
It is the second, reformist claim that is the most interesting and 
controversial. In this regard, one should focus again on Mark Roe 's work. 
The promise of the German and Japanese systems, to some American eyes, 
is that they offer the benefits of close and active supervision, without the 
costs of the hostile tender offers of the 1980s. Thus, Professor Roe wrote 
in 1991: 
Certainly concentrated control by financial institutions is imaginable: Japanese 
and German corporate ownership is quite concentrated; their financial 
institutions are more actively involved in their companies than are financial 
institutions in the United States. Daimler-Benz, the automotive concern that 
is the largest German industrial company, has a 28% share holder, Deutsche 
Bank. When managerial infighting recently left the company without clear 
direction, the bank replaced Daimler-Benz' senior management without the 
organ izational violence of a hostile takeover. 52 
Professor Roe does not make the more dramatic claim that the United 
States would be better off freeing its banks so that they could play the kind 
of role played by banks in Germany or Japan. The world, Roe recognizes, 
is a very complicated place, and the present options depend in significant 
measure on history (i .e, development is "path-dependent.").53 But the more 
dramatic suggestion lurks in the background, sometimes more prominently, 
sometimes less, and even if Roe does not make the claim, others will. It is 
this suggestion that I want to consider. What should one make of these 
comparisons? 
There are a number of points that one can make. First, the view of 
German corporate governance in which the three big banks play an 
51. Roe, Some DijJerences, supra note 1, at 1958-62. 
52. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 1, at 15. For a longer, more deta iled, and more cautious 
assessment, see Roe, Som e DijJerences, supra note 1, at 1977-95. For sugges tions that insurers could 
play a more important role in the U.S., as they do in Germany, except for regulatory restrictions, see 
Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance, supra note 42, at 641-42. 
Roe, however, is clearly aware that this alternative mon itoring structure may carry significant costs 
of its own. See, e.g .. Roc, A Political Theory , supra note 1, at 61 ("To be sure , (banks] may not take 
the stock to monitor, but to force controlled companies to take loans or do dea ls."). Roc also advocates 
the use of "comparative studies to learn when the close ti es between banks and industry in Japan and 
Germany are beneficial and when they are detrimental." !d. at 62. 
53. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1992-93. 
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important and constructive role as management monitors may be somewhat 
unrecognizable to the German corporate law community. When I presented 
this paper in Frankfurt, the lawyers and bankers in the audience found it 
extraordinary that anyone should think that the system in fact worked this 
way. In their view, the large banks played a far less significant and far less 
constructive role .54 Along these same lines, the effectiveness of the large 
German banks as monitors of management perhaps looked better a few 1 
years ago than today, after the disaster at Metalgesellschaft. 55 
Second, and more provocative, what is one to make of the fact that 
General Motors' German subsidiary, Opel, is generally considered to be as 
well-managed as other German car companies? This is a problem for any 
claim that the United States should free its banks, because G.M. is an oft-
cited example of what is so wrong with American corporate governance. 
How is it that Opel, with such a parent (and no hausbank), has been 
successful? One response is that Opel fits the model because it has a large 
shareholder, G.M. But that response fails because so do Chevrolet, 
Oldsmobile and the other poorly performing divisions of G.M. A second 
response is that the German car market is an oligopoly, and it is easy for 
managers to look good when there are oligopoly profits. However, this 
argument, even if true, would prove too much: Daimler-Benz is likewise a 
car company. 56 This, of course, leaves standing Roe's deeper and more 
fundamental argument against the inevitability of the Berle Means 
corporation: The fact that Daimler-Benz and General Motors are organized 
differently at the top proves that alternative governance structures are 
economically possible. 
Third, of course, German fields looked much greener when the United 
States was stuck in a recession and Germany seemed to be prospering than 
if things had been the other way around. The tone of comparative corporate 
scholarship has changed over the last few years as the U.S. economy has 
54. But German audi ences may have a different baseline: While banks may seem to pl ay a small 
role in German boardrooms, their role may still be substanti~lly greater than their rol e in U.S. 
boardrooms. 
55. In December 1994, Metallgersellschaft, one of Germany's largest ind ustrial cong lomerates, 
nea rl y co ll apsed after taki ng huge losses on derivatives. See Metallgesellschaji: Germany 's Corporate 
Whodwznit, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995 , at 71. Some experts blame Deutsche Bank's premature 
interven tion for the fiasco. !d. 
56. Neither Roe's example of Deutsche Bank' s relationship with Dai mler-Benz in Roe, A Political 
Theory, supra note I, at 15 , nor my counterexample of Opel, is, of course , anything more than 
anecdotal evidence. As I discuss more below, the success of either could be due to factors other than 
corporate governance structures. 
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bounced back and Germany and Japan have lagged, and may change with 
the business cycle yet again as Germany and Japan pull out of recession. 
Fourth, we do not know whether the bank centered structure that has 
historically characterized Germany and Japan is primarily driven by 
corporate governance concerns.57 As Mark Roe and Ronald Gilson have 
argued,58 the Japanese keiretsu structure may be as much about establish-
ing an efficient form of industrial organization to support a distinctive 
relationship between firms and their suppliers/customers, as it is about 
constraining agency costs. 59 Similarly, an alternative hypothesis about 
German corporate governance is that the bank's role largely revolves 
around preserving and expanding its lending activities, with only secondary 
(or tertiary) attention to corporate governance. 
Fifth, what evidence supports the implicit premise that German and 
Japanese firms are more productive than U.S. firms? The best evidence 
seems to indicate that this assertion-sometimes taken to be self-evidently 
true in the U.S.-is false or, at least, unsupported.60 
Professor Roe explicitly makes a more modest (but still important and 
controversial) reformist point that avoids many of these criticisms. Roe 
argues that if comparative work shows that different governance structures 
are possible between countries, then we should reform domestic law to 
permit governance structures to compete within the U.S. system. 61 If 
different governance structures are possible, and if different structures have 
different advantages and disadvantages in different contexts, then why not 
let them compete within the U.S. system, and not just in the competition 
between the United States and Germany or the United States and Japan? On 
this point, I am in complete agreement with Roe: Where possibie, 
competition among governance structures within the U.S. system should be 
facilitated. Here, Roe's comparative analysis demonstrating the historical 
and political contingency of the U.S. structure of corporate governance has 
significant payoffs in the domestic debate. There is, however, a further 
question, which I will address in more detail below, over the extent to 
which competing governance systems are possible within a given corporate 
57. Romano, supra note 50, at 2033. 
58. See Gilson & Roc, supra note l. 
59. !d. 
60. For a review of the evidence, see Romano, supra note 50, at 2023-26. 
61. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note l, at 1989-97. A compari son of Roe, A Political 
Theory, supra note l, with Roe, Some Differences, supra note l, suggests that Professor Roe may have 
tempered hi s reformist impulses in the intervening years. 
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law. 62 
To the extent that regulations that have outlived their usefulness stand in 
the way of the exercise of institutional voice, Roe argues, we should at 
least consider removing such blockages. In this approach, the critical 
analytical questions become whether particular regulations have, in fact, 
outlived their usefulness , the extent to which they stand in the way of an 
expanded role for institutional investors, and the transition costs. 
Examples of such regulations are the SEC proxy rules restricting 
communication among shareholders. 63 Because of the expansive defini-
tions of "proxy" and "solicitation," informal communication among large 
shareholders on matters of common concern posed a significant legal 
risk. 64 Cautious shareholders would not proceed without first preclearing 
all "proxy solicitation" materials with the SEC, an expensive and time 
consuming process. 65 In reforming the proxy rules to ease the restrictions 
on communications among shareholders, the SEC eliminated (a few) 
barriers to the evolution of alternative governance structures without either 
mandating the adoption of such structures or exposing shareholders to 
significant dangers.66 
VI. PROFESSOR BUXBAUM'S COMPARATIVE LEGITIMATION THESIS 
I now want to tum to a different contemporary approach to comparative 
corporate law. If the older comparative approach of Professor Vagts and 
Conard67 looked to Germany for potential legal transplants, and if the 
newer comparative analyses of Professor Roe and others looked to 
Germany and Japan for al ternative economic governance structures, 
Professor Richard Buxbaum has taken yet a third approach. Among 
American law professors, no one rivals Professor Buxbaum in "his intimate 
62. See infra Part Vlll. 
63. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-l to 240.i4b-2 (1995). 
64. Rule 14a-1 (f) defines a proxy as every "proxy, consent or authorization within the meaning 
of section 14(a) o f the Act." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-l(f) (1995) . So li citation includes " any request for a proxy, 
... (a)ny requ est to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; ... or .. . [t)he furni shi ng of a 
form of proxy o r other communication to secu rity holders under circumstances reasonab ly calcul ated 
to result in the procurement, wi thholding o r revocat ion of proxy." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-1(1). 
65. See generally BernardS. B lack, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 
J. CORP. L. 49 (1991). 
66. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, 
[ 1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,05 1 (Oct. 16, 1992) (desc ribing the changes to 
rules 14a-1 , 14a-2 and 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1, 240.14a-2 & 240.14a-6 (1993)). 
67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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knowledge and perfect understanding of German law."68 Like others, 
Buxbaum found the new prominence of institutional investors an occasion 
for a comparative perspective.69 
Buxbaum's comparative corporate law scholarship includes two types of 
comparative analysis, one fairly conventional, another less so.70 In the 
conventional part of his analysis, Buxbaum, relying on the German 
experience, questions a number of provocative predictions of the future of 
the American corporation. In response to Michael Jensen's somewhat 
infamous (and, so far at least, inaccurate) prediction of the eclipse of the 
publicly held corporation by the LBO association/' Buxbaum draws 
important insight on the limits of private corporate structures from 
Germany.72 Similarly, Buxbaum convincingly describes the historical 
contingency of the German hausbank stmcture, thereby questioning the 
likelihood or possibility of American evolution towards such an ap-
proach.73 
What distinguishes Buxbaum's comparativism is the less convention-
al-and more problematic-aspect of his analysis, namely, the way in 
which he seems to draw on the critical theory of the Frankfurt School74 
as a source of insight into the comparative legitimating roles of institutional 
investors. 
The old legitimating ideology-the myth of shareholder supremacy-had to 
be abandoned once institutional shareholdership threatened to make it real; 
but giving that new ownership a pejorative connotation is at best a defensive 
tactic, but hardly a legitimating ideology. That can only be found through 
cooperation with these new institutions that, after all, represent all of us in 
our capacity as salary and wage earners. 
In addition-and not in contradiction-the liberal economic premise on 
which this managerialist version of corporatism would function faces a severe 
test once ecological imperatives are expected to be operationally satisfied 
68. Kubler, supra note I, at 97. 
69. Buxbaum, supra note I. 
70. Although I will focus large ly Buxbaum's article on institutional investo rs, supra note I, 
attention should also be paid to Richard Buxbaum, Juridification and Legitimation Problems in 
American Enterprise Law, in JURIDIFI CATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE 
AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). 
71. Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public C01poration, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 
(arguing that the publicly held corporation is being replaced by the LBO association). 
72. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 26-27. 
73. !d. at 34-40. 
74. For an example of the scholarsh ip of the leading modem figure of the Frankfurt School, see 
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas A. McCarthy trans., !975). 
. .,. .. -~, 
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within its framework. . . . This, more than concern with the negative 
consequences of exposing corporate decision-making to the short-term 
mentality of stock and control markets, is what dictates a new respect for a 
different, longer term vision of corporate behavior. And this vision, unlike the 
adversarial vision of institutional investors as short-term profligates that 
underlies the narrow view of short-term versus long-term decision-making 
immanent in the liberal economy, needs the cooperation of institutional 
ownership with corporate management to be realized. Further, that coopera-
tive venture now has a unique opportunity to be realized. It can find in the 
wage-based origin of much of that institutional ownership a unique and 
perhaps the only enduring legitimation for embarking on the voyage to 
integrate ecological and efficiency concerns in a new statement of corporate 
missions and processes.75 
Buxbaum then turns to an analysis of the conditions necessary for the 
evolution of a "combined ecologic-economic frame of reference" that will 
adequately internalize "the social costs inherent in an appropriately long-
range view of production and distribution policies that are sound from 
environmental and social perspectives."76 Only large institutional interme-
diaries can accomplish this, and they can only do so if they have: 
mechanisms to express their values to their portfolio firms more directly than 
is feasible by means of voting or acting in the capital and, especially, the 
control market (though they need those, too). In the second place, they need 
mechanisms to formulate these postulated values within their own boundaries 
before transmitting them to those firms, in order to legi timate their own 
behavior and decisions. 77 
Buxbaum then turns to German legal/doctrinal stmctures not for their 
capacity to provide new mechanisms for solving the Berle and Means 
problem of separation of ownership and control, but, rather, for their 
potential to provide legitimating stmctures in the changing American 
context. From this perspective, the two favorites of American 
cornparativists--codetermination and the two-tier board stmcture-become 
interesting in so far as they provide models through which institutional 
75. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 28-29 (citation omitted). For less comparative approaches to the 
legi timacy of the American corporation, see JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORAT ION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 ( 1970); Robert Chatov, Th e Role of 
Ideology in the American Corporation , in THE CORPORATE DILEM MA: TRADITIONAL VALUES VERSUS 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (D. Votaw & S. Sethi eds., 1973); Gerald Frug, Th e Ideology of 
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 ( 1984). 
76. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 29. 
77. !d. at 30. 
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imcstors can legitimate corporate stmctures and in the extent to which 
institutional investors can themselves be legitimated through their roles in 
such stmctures. The two-tier board, on Buxbaum's analysis, helps provide 
a mechanism for systematic input by institutional investors. 
Codetermination is important in helping to undermine the traditional 
assumption of hostility between labor and capital. Finally, in terms of the 
legitimation of the institutional investors themselves and the formulation of 
an appropriate ecologic-economic frame of reference, Buxbaum rejects 
various forms of pass-through voting, finding "the German experience with 
employee intermediaries and with their selection [to] be instmctive."78 
Buxbaum finds that "the elected business agent of the union, in those 
sectors which still boast of unions, is the obvious model" of an "intermedi-
ate employee institution[] specifically designed to elicit and transmit 
employee views . . . to the portfolio-voting intermediaries. "79 In this 
connection, Buxbaum also tentatively supports "fund advisory or managing 
boards substantially elected by their beneficiaries. "80 
To the Anglo-American sensibility, Buxbaum's approach is problematic 
for two reasons. First, by immersing himself so deeply in German legal 
culture, he illustrates another danger faced by comparativists, the problem 
of "going native." If some comparative analysis is undermined by an 
insufficient understanding of the foreign system, Buxbaum mns the 
opposite risk, the risk of becoming incomprehensible to the American 
corporate law audience. Concepts like "legitimation," however familiar they 
may be in the German context, are foreign to the Berle and Means tradition 
of corporate governance scholarship described earlier. 
The second problem with Buxbaum's analysis is that it is very difficult 
to give the concept of "legitimation" non-trivial content, much less to 
employ it. If "legitimation" means something like "to make legitimate in 
the eyes of society, " then it immediately raises a host of theoretical and 
empirical questions. Do legal or economic stmctures lead to a belief in the 
legitimacy of corporations? What is the mechanism by which legal or 
economic structures make an institution legitimate in the eyes of society? 
How do you measure how legitimate an institution is? By public opinion 
surveys? What is the basis for Buxbaum's assumption that there is a 
corporate "legitimation crisis" or his speculation that institutional investors 
can "solve" that crisis? This passing critique, of course, does nothing more 
78. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 49-50. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. at 52. 
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than recapitulate the debate over the utility of "legitimation" as a sociologi-
cal construct. 81 
VII. EVALUATION 
What, then, are we to make of the comparativism of Professor Roe or 
Professor Buxbaum? Return to the observation that Opel, G.M. 's wholly-
owned German subsidiary, is generally considered to be a reasonably well-
managed German corporation. If the presence or absence of a hausbank 
does not explain the success of Opel, or, by extension, those successful 
German firms that have a hausbank, we must look elsewhere for an 
explanation. 82 
This leads us to a number of fundamental and rather embarrassing holes 
at the center of corporate governance scholarship: What is the connection, 
if any, between corporate governance structures and corporate performance? 
Even if there is a connection, what is the mechanism that links corporate 
"law" with corporate performance? 
The assumption of sixty years of corporate governance scholarship has 
been that such a connection exists. Berle and Means assumed that the 
separation of ownership and control and the resulting powerlessness of 
shareholders led to worse performance. Eisenberg and the other scholars 
who reconceptualized the board as a monitor of management seemed to 
have assumed that a company with a board dominated by independent 
outside directors would perform better than a company with a management 
dominated board. 83 Those heralding the hosti le takeover boom of the 
1980s assumed that a competitive market for corporate control led to more 
effective management. 84 Those heralding the new prominence of institu-
tional investors in the late 1980s have likewise assumed that companies 
with large active shareholders will outperform the Berle and Means 
81. For a careful and critical assessment of the utility of the concept of"legitimation" in U.S.legal 
scholarship, see Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 
379. 
82. On this point, Roe and I largely agree. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note I, at 1934-35. 
83. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
84. While there is substantial evidence that the takeovers of the 1980s benefited shareholders 
through large premiums, we do not know whether these are one shot gains arising from the influx of 
new, higher valuing buyers sparked by the relaxation of the restrictions on horizontal mergers, or 
whether these represent long term reduction in agency costs. For a review of the evidence on 
shareholder gains, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 
YALEJ.REG.ll9(!992). 
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managerial firm. 85 
While each of these claims makes some sense-they could be true-the 
supporting evidence does not exist. While there is a great deal of 
fragmentary evidence pointing in different directions, we do not have 
anything approaching convincing evidence, nor any robust theoretical 
models, on any of the most interesting questions. 86 Do outside directors 
improve corporate performance? We really do not know.87 What about 
concentrated shareholdings? While there is some evidence that firms with 
concentrated holdings outperform firms with dispersed holdings,88 we 
know little about the direction of causation: Do institutional investors 
improve corporate performance or, rather, do they choose to invest in firms 
with superior performance? 
Likewise, we do not know how corporate law affects corporate behavior. 
Some sort of direct deterrence (or even "hydraulic") modei is implicit in 
the standard 1980s argument that the threat of hostile takeovers will induce 
managers, even of non-target firms , to manage better: The pressure of 
tender offers will push all managers to manage better to keep their jobs. 
But a direct deterrence model is implausible, because both the likelihood 
of di splacement and the direct costs are relatively small. Moreover, if the 
direct deterrence model were correct, one would expect a large decline in 
mangerial performance when Delaware amended its corporation law to 
permit firms to opt out of directorial liability for breaches of the duty of 
85. See, e.g. , Jensen, supra note 71. 
86. For a very opti mistic recent survey of the empirical evidence, see Bernard Black, The Value 
of Institutional In vestor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 ( 1992). The most 
recent work likewise fa il s to find any robust correlation between governance s tructur~s and firm 
performance, although progress is bei ng made in teas ing out the more subt le connections. See. e.g., 
Ap ril Klein, Firm Production and Board Committee Structure, (April 1995) (Stem School of Business 
(NYU) Working Pape~. on file with author); James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Leadership Structure: 
On the Separation of the Positions of CEO and Chai rman of the Board, (August 23, 1995) (working 
paper, on file with author); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies w ith a Sma ll Board 
of Directors (July 1995) (Stern School of Business (NYU) Working Paper, on til e with author). 
87. For a recent survey of research on the connection between outs ide directo rs and firm 
performance, see Sanji Bhagert & Bernard Black, Do independent Directo rs Matter? (Jan. 1996) 
(working paper, on file with author). Whether and how corporate governance affects pe rformance is a 
very complicated issue. One wou ld need to so rt out the extent to wh ich governance struc ture affec ts the 
decisions made, and , when it does, whether and when the effec ts are positive or negative. A failure, for 
example, to detect any systemat ic correlat ion between governance structure and performance might be 
the result of governance not affecting the dec isions made, or mi ght resu lt fro m gove rnance leading to 
better decisions and worse decisions wit h equal frequency. 
88. !d. 
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care.89 If the principal sanction is reputational, we know little about how 
this sanction works. 90 
Thus, it is unclear how we explain why G.M. 's German subsidiary 
performs reasonably well despite its American corporate governance 
structure and much maligned parent company. The answer puts the whole 
debate over corporate governance into an important perspective. The three 
best candidates for explaining Opel's (and Daimler Benz's) performance are 
likely to be the nature of Europe's automobile markets, the nature of 
Germany's managerial labor market, and the social norms internalized by 
German managers. As a general matter, product and labor markets and 
social norms seem to trump corporate governance structures in determining 
success or failure by a wide margin.91 
Consider competitive product markets. Where markets are highiy 
competitive, such as California's high-tech industry in Silicon Valley, the 
concerns that preoccupy corporate law academics worrying about corporate 
governance are non-issues. If managers slack off or steal from the firm or 
build inefficient empires, the firm fails in short order and a firm without 
such problems takes its place. In other words, highly competitive product 
markets root out suboptimal governance structures before corporate law 
needs to pay any attention. 
This brings us back, in part, to Henry Manne 's point in the article on 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. 92 Competition policy and 
corporate law are intimately linked. On the one hand, a competition policy 
that prohibits all horizontal mergers in the interests of maintaining 
competitive product markets undermines the market for corporate control 
by removing the most likely acquirers. On the other hand, a competition 
policy that permits horizontal mergers that create market power undermines 
the competitiveness of the product markets that hold managers' feet to the 
fi re. 
Second, the example of G.M.'s German subsidiary reminds us that social 
norms play an enormously important role in the management of corpora-
tions, as they do in other areas of our social life. Because it is difficult for 
economic theorists to model norms, those of us who fo llow the Berle and 
Means economic approach to corporate law tend to ignore them. 
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § I 02b(7) ( 199 1 ). 
90. For an exploration of these issues, see Edward B. Rock, Sa ints and Sinners: The Pecu liar 
Mechanisms of Delaware Corporate Law ( 1996) (working pape r, on tile wi th author). 
91. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note I, at 1994 . 
92. Manne, supra note 34. 
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To the extent that German corporate governance works at the level of 
establishing and promoting norms of conduct for German managers and not 
on a behaviorist model of stimulus and response-sticks and carrots-the 
comparative task becomes incomparably more difficult. Unless German 
managers are motivated by the same things that motivate American 
managers, there is little reason to believe that the normative structures of 
German corporate life have very much to say to America. The 
comparativist's problem, of course, is that there is, in fact, little reason to 
believe that German managers are motivated by the same things as 
American managers. The vast differences in the level of compensation 
between the U.S., Germany and Japan suggest just the opposite.93 
Now return to Professor Buxbaum. Perhaps he is asking a fundamentally 
different question. The question that has motivated many American 
corporate law scholars since Berle and Means, and certainly much recent 
scholarship, has been, at heart, the question of how we can make managers 
sufficiently accountable so that they will manage the corporation for the 
shareholders. For Buxbaum, by contrast, the really interesting question is 
why society permits the establishment and persistence of massive private 
concentrations of economic and political power over which the political 
process exercises relatively little control. 
This contrast suggests another level on which comparative corporate law 
can be important, beyond the new comparativist's claims that the 
contrasting corporate structures of Germany and Japan are evidence that 
American structures are not inevitable, are not necessarily a product of 
natural economic selection, but are, rather, the product of a complicated 
process of social choice-Professor Roe's central thesis. Professor 
Buxbaum reminds us that the fact- if indeed it is a fact-that other 
corporate law systems take radically different questions to be fundamental 
should make us wary of being too confident that the central preoccupations 
of American corporate law are inevitable or as fundam ental as we might 
initially believe. They, too, may be the historically contingent product of 
a complicated process of social choice. That is to say, corporate law 
scholarship, like corporate governance itself, may be path dependent. 
93. See GRAEF CRYSTAL, !N SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE COMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EX ECUTIV ES 
204-!3 ( !99!) (showing that German CEOs eam approximately one-quarter of their U.S . counterparts). 
Differences in compensation are ambiguous. It may be that the differences in compensation policy grow, 
in part, out of the di ffe rence in governance st ructures, or that both grow out of differences in managerial 
norms and culture. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE DIRECTION OF 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
The United States, Japan and the countries of Western Europe all have 
successful advanced industrial economies. Likewise, all have their own 
distinctive histories: of politics, of economics, and of financial regulation. 
Examining them today, one finds that the countries have distinctive and 
distinguishable systems of corporate law. In Delaware, for example, one 
finds a system of t1exible enabling rules. This flexibility is balanced by the 
ever present judicial scrutiny that operates under a rubric of fiduciary duty 
and employs rather murky standards. In Germany, mandatory rules play a 
much greater role with a relatively marginal role for judges. In some 
countries, pre-emptive rights are mandatory; in others, they are not. In some 
countries, a bidder who acquires more than a certain percentage of the 
shares must make a bid for the remainder; in other countries, such is not 
the case. 
The tremendous variety of approaches to corporate law that one sees in 
a comparative survey, combined with an attention to the specific and 
distinctive histories of financial regulation, cautions against any straightfor-
ward attempt at transplanting. It also pushes comparative law in a 
fundamentally different direction. 
Suppose that one assumes, because of product market competition, for 
example, that each of the advanced industrial economies has a reasonably 
adequate body of corporate law. On this assumption, the comparative 
project provides an opportunity to try to grapple with two fundamental 
questions of corporate law. First, what problems must a corporate law 
system, broadly construed, solve in order to be reasonably adequate to an 
advanced industrial economy? Second, what is the range of alternative legal 
structures that can respond to those problems, and, perhaps more intriguing-
ly, how do these structures cluster? 
Roe's argument for allowing different governance structures to compete 
within the Untied States is tempting, especially to those of us who consider 
the engine for the development of improved governance structures to be 
competition: in product markets, labor markets, capital markets and among 
states for chartering revenue. One can hardly quarrel with a proposal to 
open up the choice of governance forms to new entry from abroad. 
Here, the range of possibilities is critical. A striking difference between 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, on one side, and 
Germany and France on the other, is the difference between a strikingly 
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permissive corporate law combined with active judicial review versus a 
more restrictive law with less judicial involvement. If, in fact, corporate 
governance devices, broadly construed, cluster together in identifiable sets, 
then the range of potential choices may be limited. To the extent that 
German governance devices-two-tier boards, hausbanks, or whatever else 
seems particularly attractive-presuppose a system of mandatory rules and 
limited judicial involvement, then the possibility of offering such devices 
as an option in the very different U.S. system becomes problematic for two 
reasons. First, such forms may have limited appeal when mixed with the 
Delaware structure (not itself, of course, a reason not to offer the 
possibility). More troubling, to the extent that such governance forms 
depend on structural features of the corporate law system, introducing them 
into a different structure may have unpredictable negative effects. 
Similarly, the notion that the open-textured enabling approach of 
Delaware corporate law provides an appropriate model for newly emerging 
market economies in the former Eastern Bloc may founder on the lack of 
a reliable court system, not to mention the absence of courts with the 
sophistication of the Delaware Chancery Court. 94 If judicial scrutiny is, in 
fact, an essential complement to an enabling approach to corporate law, an 
open question, then one cannot take advantage of its benefits without the 
appropriate institutional infrastructure. 
We know much about corporate law doctrine in different systems. We 
know a fair bit about how corporate law works in practice in ditTerent 
countries. We know a fair bit about the history of different systems. We 
know little, however, about the deep structure, or internal logic of corporate 
law. Indeed, we do not even know whether any such structure exists. 
Comparative corporate iaw, at its best, provides an opportunity to search 
for such an underlying basis. 
94. For a discussion of corporate law in Russ ia, see BernardS. Bl ack & Re inier Kraakman, A Self 
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, I 09 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom ing !996). 
